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Abstract—Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), have long been
the first layer of defense against malicious attacks. Most sensitive
systems employ instances of them (e.g. Firewalls) to secure the
network perimeter and filter out attacks or unwanted traffic. A
firewall, similar to classifiers, has a boundary to decide which
traffic sample is normal and which one is not. This boundary is
defined by configuration and is managed by a set of rules which
occasionally might also filter normal traffic by mistake. However,
for some applications, any interruption of the normal operation is
not tolerable e.g. in power plants, water distribution systems, gas
or oil pipelines, etc. In this paper, we design a learning firewall
that receives labelled samples and configures itself automatically
by writing preventive rules in a conservative way that avoids false
alarms. We design a new family of classifiers, called z-classifiers,
that unlike the traditional ones which merely target accuracy, rely
on zero false-positive as the metric for decision making. First,
we analytically show why naive modification of current classifiers
like SVM does not yield acceptable results and then, propose a
generic iterative algorithm to accomplish this goal. We use the
proposed classifier with CART at its heart to build a firewall
for a Power Grid Monitoring System. To further evaluate the
algorithm, we additionally test it on KDD CUP’99 dataset. The
results confirm the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Industrial Control Systems,
Power Systems, Firewall, Industrial IoT, Cyber Physical Systems,
Classification, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTRUSION Prevention Systems (IPS) are security systemsthat monitor and control the traffic coming in or going
out of the network based on a set of pre-defined rules [1].
They usually protect the perimeter of the networks and keep
the insiders away from the malicious attacks launched from
outside. The most well known examples of IPSs are firewalls.
In delay sensitive applications, where continuity of opera-
tion is vital, blocking a legitimate traffic by mistake is not
tolerable. This could be disruption in e.g. industrial Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS) or governmental services. Some tried
solving the issue by mutual authentication of interacting enti-
ties [2], however, the majority rely on IPSs. Classic intrusion
detection mechanisms rely on classification of samples and
divide them into benign and malicious [3–5]. The border
is usually drawn by using a cost minimization algorithm.
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However, this does not guarantee a zero false alarm and
occasionally legitimate traffic is filtered.
Currently, firewalls are mostly configured by experts man-
ually and with the update of attack samples, they are hardly
updated, since modifying the rule sets becomes very com-
plex especially when you do not want to tamper with the
normal traffic in organizations and industrial applications
where business continuity is crucial [6, 7]. Leaving all the
decision makings to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) is also
problematic as IDSs are usually passive systems and have
processing limitations which hinder the precise inspection of
samples when they are overloaded [8–13].
In this paper we aim to design a next generation learning
firewall that receives labelled samples (e.g. from a supervised
Intrusion Detection System (IDS)) and configures itself au-
tomatically by writing preventive rule sets in a conservative
way that avoids false alarms. In other words, we assume
that malicious and normal samples are fed to an automated
algorithm of writing preventing rules in the firewall so that
it does not block any normal or benign traffic (zero false
positive). This is vital in applications where normal operation
interruption is not tolerable e.g. in governmental services or
cyber-physical systems like power plants, water distribution
systems, etc. We design a new family of classifiers that unlike
the traditional ones which merely target accuracy, rely on zero-
false-positive as the metric for decision making. We try to
use iterative methods to accomplish this. The cost paid is an
increase in the false negative rate which we tend to minimize.
We leave the grey area to the IDS as it may evolve
and improve over the time. However, the learning firewall
proactively prevents the damage compared to the passive
approach of letting the traffic in and then decide. Besides, it
will reduce the load of the IDS too so that it can then increase
the complexity or depth of analysis for the remaining traffic. At
the final stage, the output of this new classifier is automatically
translated into non-conflicting firewall rules. We conduct some
experiments on real-world datasets obtained form industrial
systems to show how the our approach works.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II
we review the related work. Section III studies the problem of
achieving zero false positive rates and then presents a novel
algorithm to make it possible. Section IV tests the algorithm
on a power grid monitoring system as well as KDD CUP’99
datasets. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
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2II. RELATED WORK
Several papers focused on increasing the accuracy, speed of
traffic recognition or rule enforcement [14–17]. For example,
the aim of [14] is to reduce the memory usage in Internet traffic
classification methods using the decision trees. Similarly, in
[15–17], the authors worked on the fusion of rules in Cisco
and Palo Alto firewalls.
Some scientists tried to optimize the rules and their se-
quence of appearance. In firewalls, the rules are executed
in order, and the ones appearing first have higher priority.
Therefore, if a packet or data sample is to be passed (or be
blocked), performance-wise, it is better to put the correspond-
ing rules at the top. In [18, 19], the authors have worked on
the optimization of rules and their order of appearance.
Due to the issue of rule preference, sometimes conflicts are
found among them. Imagine a rule lets the packet pass while
another one shall block it. In this case, the one that appear first
in the list determines the result. Many articles have focused on
eliminating such inconsistencies among firewall rules [20–23].
In a related effort, the authors of [24] presented model
checking techniques and focused on finding violations of some
predefined policies in the rules. They also showed how the
developed methods can be used in IPv6 networks.
At a bigger scale, some researchers tried to find ways of
investigating whether firewalls of different parts of the same
network are following similar policies or not, especially in
industrial networks. For example, [25] has provided a semantic
basis for expressing and comparing policies applied in every
firewall, which in turn can form the basis for a macro judgment
of compliance with general (e.g. organizational) policies.
In a valuable effort, the same group [26], in addition to
addressing the above problem, proposed the idea of automating
firewall configuration for SCADA systems. This idea was
developed in the capacity of the ANSI/ISA 62443 standard
which is intended to express holistic security policies. The
authors tried to add extended features to the ones the standard
proposes in order to enable the firewall to use policies for
autoconfiguration. Although this research took a step towards
autoconfiguration, it was not designed to use the learned attack
patterns and merely limited a industrial network interconnec-
tions and partitioned it into zones according to the policies.
In [27], the researchers similarly worked on automating
firewall rule configuration based on a set of given policies.
In this study, Mignis tool was used for generating the rules
based on the descriptive semantics derived from policies. The
goal was to implement high level policies and not to learn
attacks for prevention purposes or to lower false positives.
In [28–30], the authors have addressed the problem of
learning firewall rules, but not by the network owner. They
investigate it from an outsider’s perspective who intends to
discover the rules written in the firewall by trial and error e.g.
through sending requests and interpreting the responses.
In [31], a firewall is designed based on a set of fuzzy rules.
In this method, the membership level of the input packet to
a set of predefined fuzzy functions is evaluated, and then the
final decision (either rejection or acceptance) is made based on
the aggregated information. The approach taken in this study
is more like a fuzzy IDS whose decisions are enforced by
an actuating IPS e.g. a firewall. However, in this paper, the
problem of false decisions has not yet been addressed.
A similar research has been done in the context of http
and web applications, but with learning capabilities [32]. It
is assumed that the normal behavior is fed into the system
in the form of XML, and any behavior that is classified as
abnormal is filtered. However, due to the lack of attention
to false positives and false negatives, the performance of this
method is questionable in industrial applications.
In [33], in addition to working on speed enhancements,
moved towards the learning capability in firewalls. They used
a Huffman tree of rules for this purpose. Learning happens
by adaptations and changes in this tree. However, the learning
criterion is merely met by crossing some hard thresholds over
the measured indicators.
A network IDS based on the biological immune mechanism
has been proposed in [9]. It aims lowering false positives. In
this method, three monitor agents (located in different parts
of the network) provide co-stimulation signals to the intrusion
detectors in order to reduce false positive alarms. Similarly, the
authors in [8] used a hybrid neuro-fuzzy approach to reduce
the number of false alarms in IDSs. The proposed approach
was experimented with different background knowledge sets in
DARPA 1999 dataset. The authors concluded through simula-
tions that their approach required less background knowledge
sets compared to other approaches. In a relevant try, [10] used
neural network to build an IDS that considers the cost ratio
of false negative errors to false positive errors. The authors
stated that compared with false positive errors, false negative
errors incur a greater loss thus must be lowered.
As explained, little work has been done in the area of au-
tomating the connection of firewalls to the units such as IDSs
and attack intelligence systems for enhancing the prevention
task. When we add the zero false positive requirement to the
problem, there remains no background in the literature.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH: ZERO-FALSE POSITIVE
AUTOMATIC FIREWALL RULE GENERATION
In this section, we first look into extending traditional clas-
sifiers like SVM to achieve a zero false positive rate. By giving
a set of examples, we show why this approach cannot serve
the purpose well. Then, a novel iterative algorithm is presented
which yields zero positive results and can accommodate almost
any classifier at its core. At the end of this section, we discuss
how a tree-based classifier can turn the algorithm output into
non-conflicting firewall rules.
A. Problem Description and Articulation
Without loss of generality, we focus on the binary classi-
fication problem. We start with the linear case. Nonlinearity
can be added by e.g. using kernels later though the algorithm
we propose is generic and can support almost every classifier.
We assume the two classes are nonseparable. We do not
have any problem with separable cases since they lead to zero
false positive results. We do not elaborate which classifier is
capable of doing so at this stage. However, for the case of
3linearly separable classes, there exists a line that correctly
separates the samples with zero error as in e.g. SVM [34].
To describe the research problem, we use the linear case.
However, this will be relaxed later. Fig. 1a shows a two-
class set of data samples which are linearly non-separable.
A linear boundary has been drawn just as an example to serve
the development of subsequent formula. Let us denote the
labelled (training) samples of Class 1 (+) and Class 2 (-) by
xi ; i = 1, ..., N . The goal is to find a boundary that achieves
zero false positive; the statement that once decided that an
input sample is +, is not wrong.
This means that no sample of Class 2 shall be classified
as 1 (or +). You may imagine Class 1 is the set of attack
samples and Class 2 is the set of normal ones in an industrial
network security context. Therefore, no normal sample should
be classified as malicious as it will be blocked and this
interrupts the normal system operation.
Similarly, we could consider biometric security systems.
In physical security systems, like fingerprint readers, false
positives (false acceptances) are not tolerable, though they
come at the cost of some extra false negatives. It is pre-
ferred that the granted permissions are always correct, even if
sometimes legitimate users have to re-enter their fingerprints
for the reader to pick. However, in insensitive commercial
applications, manufacturers tend to compromise some security
for functionality as repetitive data entry is not convenient.
One can achieve a zero false positive rate, but it might
come at the cost of a low true negative rate (or high
false negative rate). We tend to additionally minimize false
negatives, or equivalently, maximize true negatives. This
could be translated into minimizing the number of samples
in Class 1 (+) that fall on the other side of the boundary
and are classified as (−). The two above-mentioned goals are
not easy to achieve simultaneously. In the next subsection,
we mathematically show how a classic classifier works and
then in Subsection C, extend it in a try to make a zero false
positive classifier.
B. Formulation of the Classic Approach (SVM)
There are different methods for formulation of linear classi-
fiers facing mixed data. Normally, at some point during the de-
velopment, one faces a discrete variable counting the number
of misclassified samples which is usually replaced by a not-so
accurate continuous approximation to keep the problem convex
[34]. We formulate the binary classification problem following
the classic approach for SVM as an example. However, later
during the process, we diverge from the normal definitions
as we are following different targets. In SVM, depending on
where the training sample xi lies with respect to the linear
boundary a.xi + b0 = 0, we will have different conditions. If
yi is a scalar variable whose value is +1 for the + samples
and -1 for the − ones, we can express these conditions with
respect to the boundary as below:
• The sample is correctly classified and falls outside the
gutter (band) specified by a.xi + b0 = ±1. For such
samples which are shown by circles around them and lie
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Fig. 1. (a) Traditional classification of linearly non-separable classes in a
trade of between gutter and the weight of misclassified samples. The circles
show correctly classified samples and the square ones are misclassified. (b)
Zero false-positive classification using the same classic principles but with
different criteria.
outside the gutter in Fig.1a, we have:
yi(a.xi + b0) ≥ 1 (1)
where equality happens when the sample (support vector)
is on either of the two parallel gutter lines.
• The sample is correctly classified with the given a and
b0, but lies inside the gutter:
0 ≤ yi(a.xi + b0) < 1 (2)
Again, since these are classified correctly, they are shown
by circles in Fig. 1(a).
• The sample is classified in the wrong class:
yi(a.xi + b0) < 0 (3)
These samples are shown by squares in Fig. 1(a).
Some rewrite all the three in a single equation by using a
slack variable as:
yi(a.xi + b0) ≥ 1− ηi (4)
where ηi = 0 in the first case, 0 < ηi ≤ 1 in the second,
and ηi > 1 in the third. Usually, the classification goal is to
make the gutter as wide as possible while keeping the number
of misclassified samples minimal. With the above formula-
tion, the gutter width will be 2/||a|| [34]. For mathematical
convenience, it is usual to minimize 12 ||a||2 instead. The cost
function for such a minimization problem would be:
J(a, b0,η) =
1
2
||a||2 + c
N∑
i=1
F(ηi) (5)
F(ηi) =
{
1, if ηi > 0
0, if ηi = 0
(6)
To remove the discontinuous functions and make the prob-
lem convex [34], the the term
∑N
i=1 F(ηi) is usually approx-
imated by
∑N
i=1 ηi, which does not actually minimize the
number of misclassified samples, but rather a cost function
4related to that:
arg min
a,b0
J(a, b0,η) =
1
2
||a||2 + c
N∑
i=1
ηi (7)
sbj. to : yi(a.xi + b0) ≥ 1− ηi
ηi ≥ 0
where the positive constant c specifies the importance of the
second term compared to the gutter width. This was a short
introduction to the classic problem formulation.
C. Extension of the Classic Approach (z-SVM)
The above formulation does not guarantee a zero false pos-
itive rate. Fig. 1a shows a linearly non-separable constellation
in which one sample from each class has been misclassified.
Obviously, in Eq. (8), the optimization algorithm does not
have any preference over the classes. We can extend the
classic formulation towards giving preference to one class and
outputting zero false-positive results. If we break down the
number of training samples as N = nn + np, we can write:
arg min
a,b0
J(a, b0,η) =
1
2
||a||2 + c1
nn∑
i=1
ηi + c2
N∑
i=nn+1
ηi (8)
sbj. to : yi(a.xi + b0) ≥ 1− ηi
ηi ≥ 0
where c1 > c2. We refer to this classifier as z-SVM. The goal
is to achieve something like Fig. 1b with zero false positives
while keeping the false negatives as low as possible.
D. The Issues with z-SVM
In the previous subsection, we developed a convex formu-
lation based on the classic approach to increase the cost of
misclassification for − samples. By choosing c1  c2, one
can make the optimization algorithm try to zero the number
of misclassifications for the negative samples. However, there
are a number of issues with this naive approach which can
make it impractical in certain scenarios.
1) Continuous Error Approximation: The optimization al-
gorithm is blind to the details of the problem. In certain cases,
it deceives us by manipulating the gutter width. Based on
Eq. (8), the classification error contributing to the cost function
is the sum of ηi ; i = 1, ..., N . When we want to increase c
(e.g. c1, hoping to achieve zero false positive), the optimizer
tends to make the gutter width smaller to virtually reduce the
errors (see Eq. (8)). This is due to the fact that ηi is a function
of the gutter width itself. Fig. 2a to 2c demonstrate this fact.
2) Weight Coefficients Effect: z-SVM is highly sensitive to
c1 and c2 values. It is not just their ratio that matters, their
absolute values are also important along with the ||a||.
There are three cost components in Eq. (8). If we choose a
big value for c1 and a rather small one for c2, we might achieve
a zero false positive rate. However, there is still a probability
that this does not happen. For example, if exists a ”−” sample
deep inside the positive class region, it will contribute a large
ηi whose cost is further boosted by c1. However, to make
the false positive zero, the algorithm shall move the boundary
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Fig. 2. The effect of cost coefficient (c) on z-SVM result: (a) c1 = 1,
c2 = 1 (b) c1 = 5, c2 = 5 (c) c1 = 50, c2 = 50 (d) c1 = 500, c2 = 50
(e) c1 = 785, c2 = 50 (f) c1 = 800, c2 = 50 (g) c1 = 1000, c2 = 50. (h)
c1 = 80, c2 = 5.
line and misclassify some positive samples. Each of these
samples (let us say j) adds c2ηj to the cost. If the number
of such samples is high, their cumulative cost might surpass
c1ηi. Therefore, the minimization algorithm might not output
a zero false-positive result. This is highly dependent on the
constellation of samples, how the classes are mixed, and the
choice of c1 and c2. Fig. 2d demonstrates this issue.
A very large value for c1 can solve this issue, but it
induces another problem. By choosing such a value for c1, the
dominant component in the cost function will be the second
term. This implies that the gutter width and the + samples
5misclassification error will have little or no effect. This might
for example lead to a boundary that misclassifies too many
positive sample in order to keep c1
∑nn
i=1 ηi minimum. Fig. 2e
to 2g show this phenomenon. Comparison of Fig. 2f and
Fig. 2h which have the same c1/c2 ratio shows that the third
cost component, i.e. ||a|| can significantly change the final
result. Note that in the settings achieving zero false positive
rates, the number of misclassified positive samples are signif-
icantly different, ranging from 9 to 16, with Fig. 2e having
the minimum number of such samples. The cost coefficients
in Fig. 2e are trivially different from those in Fig. 2f, yet the
results are very different. This shows how sensitive the final
result is to the choice of c1 and c2.
3) Sample Unbalance Problem: The training sample un-
balance problem is very well known. This is not something
specific to z-SVM. Imagine that there are merely a few
negative training samples and too many positive ones. In
such occasions, the cost of misclassification for the negative
samples is practically capped and the optimizer might decide
to minimize the cost function based on the dominant factor
defined by the too-many positive samples. This implies that
we need to adjust c1/c2 per case.
The above discussions showed some of the problems of z-
SVM; an example of traditional classifiers extension. Many of
these problems pertain to the fact that the counting function
(e.g. of Eq. (6)) is replaced with an approximate alternative in
the convex problem development process. One can of course
stick with original optimization problems (e.g. Eq. (5)) and
try to extend them for zero false positive goal while honoring
the discrete constraints (like Eq. (6)). However, the result will
be a non-convex or discrete problem at the end.
In the next section, we propose a novel algorithm for this
purpose. We use classic approaches at the core of the algorithm
but iteratively prune the samples based on its outputs to
achieve zero false positive rates with minimum number of
false negatives. Minimizing the number of false negatives will
allow the firewall to capture as many malicious samples as
possible and lower the load of the sophisticated IDS, if ever
installed. Finally, using a tree classifier at the core, we test
our algorithm and show how its output can be translated into
simple non-conflicting firewall rules.
Given a classifier, false positives can be avoided if one
sacrifices some of the positive samples. We suggest that this
is done by removal. It can be proven that a removing strategy
always converges to a zero-false positive result. However, the
question is which positive samples shall be sacrificed to make
 Original Labelled 
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(Training Dataset)
Classify the Set
Separable?
END
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Remove the  
Samples Causing 
False Negatives 
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New Dataset
No
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Fig. 3. Flowchart of the proposed iterative classification algorithm (z-
Classifier). The goal is to achieve zero false positive rate.
this happen. We can represent the problem as a binary satisfia-
bility one. Imagine the positive samples are the set of variables,
each being represented by a bit. A value of 0 for a bit implies
that the corresponding sample shall be removed from the set.
Regarding the example of Fig. 1, this binary coding will be like
{bA, bB , bC , bD, bE , ...}; bi ∈ {0, 1}. Now, given the classifier
C, the remaining set can be tested to see if its samples satisfy
separability. Therefore, the problem is analogous to a boolean
satisfiability (SAT) problem. It can be proven that the problem
is always satisfiable. In general, finding an assignment of zeros
and ones that has the minimum number of variables set to one
(or similarly to zero) is NP-complete, even for a satisfiable
2-SAT problem [35]. This is sometimes called Min Ones k-
SAT problem in the literature. The solution is not always
unique though. For example, in Fig. 1 and with a linear C,
both {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, ...} and {0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, ...} will satisfy the
separability thus the resultant boundaries can be acceptable.
Although there could be several answers, some additional
constraints in the cost function (like maximum gutter width
or distance to the border) can reduce the set of answers.
E. The Proposed Zero-FP Classifier (z-Classifier)
The proposed algorithm is an iterative classification method
which achieves a zero false detection rate for the positive
class. It is a swarm algorithm whose particles are reduced
datasets. Each reduced dataset consists of all the negative
samples and some of the positive ones. In this sense, we
can represent each particle with a binary coding similar to
before i.e. {b1, b2, ..., bnp}; bi ∈ {0, 1}, where for the sake
of simplicity, we have removed the 1s of the negative class
members as they are always present. Each particle follows an
algorithm which is illustrated in Fig. 3. The grey box is where
it uses the knowledge obtained by other particles.
Each particle starts with an initial dataset which is derived
from the original one by removing some of the positive
samples in order to become separable. Ideally, this initial
dataset has only one positive sample, and all the negative ones.
Given the classifier C, one can do an initial classification on
the original dataset and use the true positives as candidates
to make this initial dataset. Every particle’s reduced dataset
goes through a classification by using C. In each iteration, if
the result shows separability of the set (zero false positive
and zero false negative), the set is compared against the
best result obtained by other particles so far. The comparison
criterion could be a predefined fitness function e.g. the number
of positive samples included as we intend to minimize the
number of false negatives. If the particle’ reduced set yields
a better score, the best record is replaced with its set. Then,
the boundary model obtained through the process is applied
to the original dataset (as a test set) and the new true positives
are tentatively added to the particle’s set for the next iteration.
This is done by setting their flag to 1. Moreover, some extra
positive samples that are misclassified by this boundary are
also selected and added to the set. There can be different
selection criteria for this purpose, however, we suggest that
one uses the global best (as in Particle Swarm Optimization)
for this purpose. For example, one can use weighted random
6Algorithm 1 The Proposed Iterative Classification Technique
with Zero False Positive (z-Classifier)
Require: Training Set(T ), Performance Target/Stop Criterion
Ensure: Zero False Positive Classification
1: Create initial separable particle sets S1, ...Sk
2: Determine the Best set (with the most positive samples)
3: while Stop Criterion/Performance Target is not met do
4: for each Si do
5: Classify Si with C and find the boundary Bi
6: if Si is separable then
7: Update the Best if Si is more fit
8: Apply Bi to T & add the true positives to Si
9: Use the Best and Si knowledge to add ki false
positive samples to Si
10: else
11: if there is false negatives then
12: Remove false negative samples from Si
13: else
14: Duplicate false positive samples in Si
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
18: end while
selection to pick k samples from the set of falsely classified
positive samples (of the original set) and add them to the
particle’s set. Obviously, the positive samples included in the
best set should have more weight in this selection.
On the other hand, throughout the iterations, if a particle’s
set becomes inseparable at some point, it will undergo a
pruning operation. The pruning is initially done by removing
the positive samples that have created false negatives. If this
does not help (which will be known in the next iteration(s))
or the source of inseparability is non-zero false positive,
the weight of the negative samples contributing to the false
positives is increased. This can be done by e.g. duplicating
those negative samples in the particle’s dataset. As it can
be seen, the reduced dataset of particle is not necessarily a
subset of the original dataset yet they are related. The pruning
continues over iterations until the set becomes separable again.
The whole addition/removal process terminates when either
the target false negative is met or the maximum number of
allowed iterations is reached. Algorithm 1 shows z-Classifier.
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Here, we evaluate z-Classifier by testing it on two datasets.
We take the CART algorithm as our classifier. Classic firewalls
can define rules by combining clauses that put constraints on
the values of features. However, each clause merely constrains
one feature. For such construction, tree-based classifiers like
CART produce more compatible results. In the simulations,
the population size was 5 and ki was increased exponentially
by a factor of 1.5 (from 1) for faster convergence. It was reset
to 1 every time the set became non-separable.
A. Power System (Smart Grid) Dataset
Smart grids or power systems have supervisory control
systems interacting with different smart electronic devices.
They are complemented by network monitoring devices such
as SNORT and Syslog. Some researchers created a dataset of
attacks launched in power systems [36, 37]. In their scenario, it
is assumed that an actor gains access to a substation network
and poses an insider threat by issuing commands from the
substation switch. The scenarios studied were (1) Short-circuit
fault, (2) Line maintenance (3) Remote tripping command
injection (Attack), (4) Relay setting change (Attack), and (5)
Data Injection (Attack) [36, 37]. This study worked on events
categorized in binary classes which contained 37 event scenar-
ios grouped as either attack (28 events) or normal operations (9
events). We used a subset of the dataset with 1861 normal and
3415 attack samples described by 128 features. Date and time
were taken out of the dataset records as we did not want the
classifier to rely on those for detection. The results of applying
z-Classifier on this dataset are shown in Table I. As one can see
and similar to before, the proposed classifier always maintains
a zero false positive output.
B. Results of KDD CUP’99 Dataset
KDD Cup’99 dataset has been developed by MIT Lincoln
Laboratory in 1999 [38]. We use a subset of the dataset that
has 10% of the total records (494,021). Every record has 41
features and contains a label for the sample class. Along with
normal samples, there are 24 types of attacks in the training
set which fall into four categories. However, we turned all the
attack labels into malicious so that the algorithm is left with
a decision of ACCEPT or REJECT for each sample. Even
a simple classifier obtained after 10 iterations can capture
138,869 out of 204,458 malicious samples with zero false
positive. The complete tree after 1000 iterations yields much
better results which are reported in Table II. Please note that
just like any learning classifier, z-Classifier is also prune to
over-fitting. We noticed over-fittings after the 100th iteration
with KDD CUP’99 dataset. One can adopt traditional best
practices to avoid this phenomenon.
Translation of the z-Classifier output to firewall rules is a
trivial task now. For the tree described before, the first few
rules of a default-allow firewall will be like:
IF x29 < 0.255 & x35 ≥ 0.145 & x32 < 97.5 then REJECT
IF x29 ≥ 0.255 & x37 ≥ 0.055 & x23 ≥ 4.50 then REJECT
TABLE I
z-CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE ON THE POWER GRID DATASET OF [36, 37]
Iterations TN TP FN FP
10 1861 320 3095 0
50 1861 888 2527 0
100 1861 2211 1204 0
500 1861 3231 184 0
1000 1861 3353 62 0
7TABLE II
z-CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE ON KDD CUP’99 DATASET.
Iterations TN TP FN FP
10 289,542 138,869 65,589 0
50 289,542 204,167 291 0
100 289,542 204,425 33 0
500 289,542 204,432 26 0
1000 289,542 204,432 26 0
...
in which x29 (’same srv rate’) shows the percentage of con-
nections to the same service, x35 (’dst host diff srv rate’)
is the percentage of connections to different services, x32
(’dst host count’) is the number of connections to the same
destination host, x37 (’dst host srv diff host rate’) shows the
percentage of connections to the same service coming from
different hosts, and x23 is the number of connections to the
same host as current connection in the past two seconds.
V. CONCLUSION
Rejecting legitimate traffic by mistake is not tolerable in
real-time industrial systems e.g. power systems. Intrusion
detection systems, if ever installed, also have limited capacity
of inspection and it is preferred that the attacks are filtered
at intrusion preventions systems such as firewalls as much
as possible. In this study, a new classifier is introduced that
can help in building self-organizing learning firewalls. Current
classifiers tend to minimize a generic cost function which does
not necessarily yield zero false positive results. In this paper,
we proposed an algorithm that can turn any generic classifier
into a zero false positive one. One can use this classifier to
build a self-organizing and learning firewalls. In the design of
this new approach zero false positive (or negative) rate has
been set as the goal, while the false negative (or positive) rate
is kept minimum. The designed classifier was tested on two
datasets; a power grid dataset and KDD CUP’99 dataset. We
also showed how a tree-based classifier can help us automate
writing zero-false positive firewall rules.
APPENDIX A
SATISFIABILITY WITH THE REMOVAL STRATEGY
Theorem 1. Given a dataset with two classes and a sound
classifier like C, an iterative removal strategy that takes the
false positive samples out in each iteration will always lead
to a zero false positive result.
Proof. Assume that the training dataset is (xi, yi) where i =
1, 2, ...,m and yi ∈ {1,−1}. The zero FP algorithm applies
a sound classifier C as a core classifier which minimizes a
predefined cost function like J .
First, the algorithm starts on the complete and original
dataset. After classification, there are two types of misclassi-
fied samples which make the classification errors. The first one
corresponds to false negatives (EP→N ), and the second one
is related to false positives (EP→N ). The cost function of the
classifier is J(EP→N0 , E
N→P
0 ), where the 0 superscript shows
the iteration number. According to the zero FP algorithm, the
positive samples which make EP→N must be removed from
the original data set at this stage. After applying the classifier
boundary to the new data set (after removal), EP→N will
be zeroed. Hence, the cost function of the zero FP algorithm
at this stage becomes J(EN→P1 ) < J(E
P→N
0 , E
N→P
0 ). This
inequality can be rewritten as:
J(EN→P1 ) = r1 J(E
P→N
0 , E
N→P
0 ) (9)
where 0 ≤ r1 ≤ 1. Sequentially, the sound classifier provides
a new classification boundary for the modified dataset whose
cost function is J(EP→N2 , E
N→P
2 ). Since the dataset is
modified, C tried to minimize the misclassification errors so
that it is less than (or in the worst case equal to) the previous
iteration, i.e. J(EP→N2 , E
N→P
2 ) < J(E
N→P
1 ). Hence,
J(EP→N2 , E
N→P
2 ) = q1 J(E
N→P
1 ) (10)
where 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1. Similarly the algorithm removes the
positive samples which have been misclassified. At the kth
iteration, the cost function will be:
J(EP→Nk , E
N→P
k ) = qk J(E
N→P
k−1 ); 0 ≤ qk ≤ 1 (11)
and at the k + 1th one,
J(EN→Pk+1 ) = rk J(E
P→N
k , E
N→P
k ); 0 ≤ rk ≤ 1 (12)
This way, at each iteration a reduced set is prepared for the
next iteration. By substituting Eq. (11) in Eq. (12),
J(EN→Pk+1 ) = (rk qk) J(E
N→P
k−1 ) (13)
Similarly,
J(EN→Pk+1 ) =
(
ΠNk=1(rk qk)
)
J(EP→N0 , E
N→P
0 ) (14)
As ΠNk=1(rk qk) goes to zero, we have
lim
k→∞
J(EN→Pk+1 ) = 0 (15)
Notice that max(N) is the number of positive samples.
Therefore, the cost function of the zero FP algorithm with
a sound cost-minimizing classifier will converge to zero, and
all negative samples will be truly classified.
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